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Despite its enormous empirical success, the formalism of quantum theory still raises fundamental
questions: why is nature described in terms of complex Hilbert spaces, and what modifications of
it could we reasonably expect to find in some regimes of physics? Here we address these questions
by studying how compatibility with thermodynamics constrains the structure of quantum theory. We
employ two postulates that any probabilistic theory with reasonable thermodynamic behavior should
arguably satisfy. In the framework of generalized probabilistic theories, we show that these postu-
lates already imply important aspects of quantum theory, like self-duality and analogues of projective
measurements, subspaces and eigenvalues. However, they may still admit a class of theories beyond
quantum mechanics. Using a thought experiment by von Neumann, we show that these theories
admit a consistent thermodynamic notion of entropy, and prove that the second law holds for projec-
tive measurements and mixing procedures. Furthermore, we study additional entropy-like quantities
based on measurement probabilities and convex decomposition probabilities, and uncover a relation
between one of these quantities and Sorkin’s notion of higher-order interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics has existed for about 100 years
now, but despite its enormous success in experiment
and application, the meaning and origin of its counter-
intuitive formalism is still widely considered to be diffi-
cult to grasp. Many attempts to put quantum mechan-
ics on a more intuitive footing have been made over
the decades, which includes the development of a va-
riety of interpretations of quantum physics (such as the
many-worlds interpretation [1], Bohmian mechanics [2],
QBism [3], and many others [4]), and a thorough anal-
ysis of its departure from classical physics (as in Bell’s
Theorem [5] or in careful definitions of notions of con-
textuality [6]). In more recent years, researchers, mostly
coming from and inspired by the field of quantum infor-
mation processing (early examples include [21, 22, 51]),
have taken as a starting point the set of all probabilis-
tic theories. Quantum theory is one of them and can be
uniquely determined by specifying some of its charac-
teristic properties [53] (as in e.g. [19, 43, 51, 54, 55, 57–
61]).
While the origins of this framework date back at least
to the 1960s [15, 16, 18], it was the development of quan-
tum information theory with its emphasis on simple
operational setups that led to a new wave of interest
in “generalized probabilistic theories” (GPTs) [51, 52].
This framework turned out to be very fruitful for funda-
mental investigations of quantum theory’s information-
theoretic and operational properties. For example, GPTs
make it possible to contrast quantum information the-
ory with other possible theories of information process-
ing, and in this way to gain a deeper understanding of
its characteristic properties in terms of computation or
communication.
In a complementary approach, there has been a wave
of attempts to find simple physical principles that sin-
gle out quantum correlations from the set of all non-
signalling correlations in the device-independent for-
malism [70]. These include non-trivial communication
complexity [71], macroscopic locality [72], or informa-
tion causality [73]. However, none of these principles
so far turns out to yield the set of quantum correlations
exactly. This led to the discovery of “almost quantum
correlations” [75] which are more general than those al-
lowed by quantum theory, but satisfy all the aforemen-
tioned principles. Almost quantum correlations seem to
appear naturally in the context of quantum gravity [77].
A relation to other fields of physics can also be drawn
from information causality, which can be understood
as the requirement that a notion of entropy [66–69] ex-
ists which has some natural properties like the data-
processing inequality [74]. These emergent connections
to entropy and quantum gravity are particularly inter-
esting since they point to an area of physics where mod-
ifications of quantum theory are well-motivated: Ja-
cobson’s results [78] and holographic duality [79] relate
thermodynamics, entanglement, and (quantum) gravity,
and modifying quantum theory has been discussed as
a means to overcome apparent paradoxes in black-hole
physics [80].
While generalized probabilistic theories provide a
way to generalize quantum theory and to study more
general correlations and physical theories, they still
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2leave open the question as to which principles should
guide us in applying the GPT formalism for this pur-
pose. The considerations above suggest taking, as a
guideline for such modifications, the principle that they
support a well-behaved notion of thermodynamics. As
A. Einstein [32] put it,
“A theory is the more impressive the greater the simplicity
of its premises, the more different kinds of things it relates, and
the more extended its area of applicability. Therefore the deep
impression that classical thermodynamics made upon me. It
is the only physical theory of universal content which I am
convinced will never be overthrown, within the framework of
applicability of its basic concepts.”
Along similar lines, A. Eddington [33] argued that
“The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the
supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points
out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagree-
ment with Maxwell’s equations then so much the worse for
Maxwell’s equations. If it is found to be contradicted by ob-
servation well, these experimentalists do bungle things some-
times. But if your theory is found to be against the second law
of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing
for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.”
Here we take this point of view seriously. We investi-
gate what kinds of probabilistic theories, including but
not limited to quantum theory, could peacefully coex-
ist with thermodynamics. We present two postulates
that formalize important physical properties which can
be expected to hold in any such theory. On the one
hand, these two postulates allow for a class of theories
more general than quantum or classical theory, which
thus describes potential alternative physics consistent
with important parts of thermodynamics as we know
it. Indeed, by considering a thought experiment origi-
nally conceived by von Neumann, we show that these
theories all give rise to a unique, consistent form of
thermodynamical entropy. Furthermore, we show that
this entropy satisfies several other important proper-
ties, including two instances of the second law. On the
other hand, we show that these postulates already im-
ply many structural properties which are also present in
quantum theory, for example self-duality and the exis-
tence of analogues of projective measurements, observ-
ables, eigenvalues and eigenspaces.
In summary, our analysis shows that important struc-
tural aspects of quantum and classical theory are al-
ready implied by these aspects of thermodynamics, but
on the other hand it suggests that there is still some “el-
bow room” for modification within these limits dictated
by thermodynamics.
Thermodynamics in GPTs has been considered in
some earlier works. In [35, 36], the authors intro-
duced a notion of (Re´nyi-2-)entanglement entropy, and
studied the phenomenon of thermalization by entan-
glement [37–39] and the black-hole information prob-
lem (in particular the Page curve [40]) in generalizations
of quantum theory. Ha¨nggi and Wehner [46] have re-
lated the uncertainty principle to the second law in the
framework of GPTs. Chiribella and Scandolo ([45, 47],
see also [48]) have considered the notion of diagonal-
ization and majorization in general theories, leading
to a resource-theoretic approach to thermodynamics in
GPTs. There are various connections between their re-
sults and ours, but there are essential differences. In par-
ticular, they assume the purification postulate (which is
arguably a strong assumption that in particular excludes
classical thermodynamics), whereas we are not mak-
ing any assumption on composition of systems what-
soever, and in this sense work in a more general frame-
work. Furthermore, while Chiribella and Scandolo take
a resource-theoretic approach motivated by quantum
information theory, our analysis relies on a more tra-
ditional thermodynamical thought experiment (namely
von Neumann’s). We presented results related to some
of those in the present paper in the conference proceed-
ings [31]; here we use different assumptions and obtain
additional results.
Our paper is organized as follows. We start with an
overview of the framework of generalized probabilis-
tic theories. Then we present von Neumann’s thought
experiment on thermodynamic entropy, and a modifi-
cation of it due to Petz [42]. Although it relies on very
mild assumptions, it already rules out all theories that
admit a state space known as the gbit or squit (a square-
shaped state space that can be used to describe one of
the two local subsytems of a composite system known
as the PR-box [83], exhibiting stronger-than-quantum
correlations). Then we present our two postulates, and
show that they imply many structural features of quan-
tum theory. We show that theories that satisfy both pos-
tulates behave consistently in von Neumann’s thought
experiment and admit a notion of thermodynamic en-
tropy which satisfies versions of the second law.
Because entropies are an important bridge between
information theory and thermodynamics, in the final
section we investigate the consequences of our postu-
lates for generalizations of quantities of known signifi-
cance in quantum thermodynamics [30], defined by ap-
plying Re´nyi entropies to probabilities in convex decom-
positions of a state, or of measurements made on a state.
In particular, we show a relation between max-entropy
and Sorkin’s notion of higher-order interference [76]:
equality of the preparation and measurement based
max-entropies implies the absence of higher-order inter-
ference. Most proofs are deferred to the appendix. Sev-
eral results of this paper have been announced in the
Master thesis of one of the authors [34].
II. THE MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
Our results are obtained in the framework of gener-
alized probabilistic theories (GPTs) [51, 52, 55, 85, 88].
The goal of this framework is to capture all proba-
bilistic theories, i.e. all theories that use states to make
predictions for probabilities of measurement outcomes.
3FIG. 1. An example state space, A, modelling a so-called “gbit” [52]
which is often used to describe one half of a PR-box. The opera-
tional setup is depicted on the left, and the mathematical formulation
is sketched on the right. An agent (“Alice”) holds a black box ω
into which she can input one bit, a ∈ {0, 1}, and obtains one out-
put, x ∈ {1, 2}. The box is described by a conditional probability
p(x|a). In the GPT framework, ω becomes an actual state, i.e. an el-
ement of some state space Ω. Concretely, ω = (1, p(1|0), p(1|1)) ∈
R3, where the first entry 1 is used to describe the normalization,
p(1|0) + p(2|0) = p(1|1) + p(2|1). In this case, all probabilities are
allowed by definition, so that the state space Ω becomes the square,
i.e. the points (1, s, t) with 0 ≤ s, t ≤ 1. Alice’s input a is inter-
preted as a “choice of measurement”, and the two measurements are
e
(a=0)
x=1 , e
(a=0)
x=2 resp. e
(a=1)
x=1 , e
(a=1)
x=2 such that
∑2
x=1 e
(a)
x (ω) = 1 for
all states ω ∈ Ω. If we describe effects by vectors by using the stan-
dard inner product, we have, for example, e(a=0)x=1 = (0, 1, 0), since
e
(a=0)
x=1 (ω) = P (1|0) = (0, 1, 0) · ω. There are four pure states,
labelled ω1, . . . , ω4. Every pure state ωi is perfectly distinguishable
from every other pure state ωj for j 6= i, but no more than two
of them are jointly distinguishable in a single measurement. More
generally, every state on one side of the square is perfectly distin-
guishable from every state on the opposite side. The unit effect is
uA = (1, 0, 0).
Although the framework is based on very weak and
natural assumptions, we can only provide a short in-
troduction of the main notions and results here. For
more detailed explanations of the framework, see e.g.
[34, 51, 52, 55, 86, 87]. The framework contains quan-
tum theory and also the application of probability the-
ory to classical physics, often referred to as classical
probability theory, as special cases. It also contains theo-
ries which differ substantially from classical or quantum
probability theory, for example boxworld [52], which
allows superstrong nonlocality, and theories that allow
higher-order interference [76].
A central notion is that of the state and the set of
states, the state space ΩA. A state contains all informa-
tion necessary to calculate all probabilities for all out-
comes of all possible measurements. One possible and
convenient representation would be to simply list the
probabilities of a set of “fiducial” measurement out-
comes which is sufficient to calculate all outcome prob-
abilities for all measurements [51, 52]. An example is
given in Figure 1.
It is possible to create statistical mixtures of states: Let
us assume a black box device randomly prepares a state
ω1 with probability p1 and a state ω2 with probability p2.
In agreement with the representation of states as lists of
probabilities and the law of total probability, the appro-
priate state to describe the resulting measurement statis-
tics is ω = p1ω1 + p2ω2. This means that the state space
ΩA is convex and is embedded into a real vector space
A (to be described below). Due to the interpretation of
states as lists of probabilities (which are between 0 and
1) we demand that ΩA is bounded. Any state that cannot
be written as a convex decomposition of other states is
called a pure state. As pure states cannot be interpreted
as statistical mixtures of other states, they are also called
states of maximal knowledge. Furthermore, there is no
physical distinction between states that can be prepared
exactly, and states that can be prepared to arbitrary ac-
curacy. Thus, we also assume that ΩA is topologically
closed. In order to not obscure the physics by the mathe-
matical technicalities introduced by infinite dimensions,
we will assume that A is finite-dimensional. Thus ΩA is
compact. Consequently, every state can be obtained as a
statistical mixture of finitely many pure states [89].
Furthermore, it turns out to be convenient to in-
troduce unnormalized states ω, defined as the non-
negative multiples of normalized states. They form a
closed convex cone A+ := R≥0 · ΩA. For simplic-
ity of description, we choose the vector space contain-
ing the cone of states to be of minimal dimension, i.e.
span(A+) = A.
We introduce the normalization functional uA : A →
R which attains the value one on all normalized states,
i.e. uA(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ ΩA. It is linear, non-negative
on the whole cone, zero only for the origin, and ω ∈ A+
is an element of ΩA if and only if uA(ω) = 1. The nor-
malization uA(ω) can be interpreted as the probability
of success of the preparation procedure. For states with
uA(ω) < 1, the preparation succeeds with probability
uA(ω). The states with normalization > 1 do not have
a physical interpretation, but adding them allows us to
take full advantage of the notion of cones from convex
geometry.
Effects are functionals that map (sub)normalized
states to probabilities, i.e. into [0, 1]. To each measure-
ment outcome we assign an effect that calculates the out-
come probability for any state. Effects have to be lin-
ear for consistency with the statistical mixture interpre-
tation of convex combinations of states. A measurement
(with n outcomes) is a collection of effects e1, . . . , en such
that e1 + . . . + en = uA. Its interpretation is that per-
forming the measurement on some state ω ∈ ΩA yields
outcome i with probability ei(ω).
A set of states ω1, . . . , ωn is called perfectly distin-
guishable if there exists a measurement e1, . . . , en such
that ei(ωj) = δij , that is, 1 if i = j and 0 other-
wise. A collection of n perfectly distinguishable pure
states is called an n-frame, and a frame is called max-
imal if it has the maximal number n of elements pos-
sible in the given state space. In quantum theory,
for example, the maximal frames are exactly the or-
4thonormal bases of Hilbert space. In more detail, a
frame on anN -dimensional quantum system is given by
ω1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, . . . , |ψN 〉〈ψN |, where |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψN 〉 are
orthonormal basis vectors.
Transformations are maps T : A → A that map states
to states, i.e. T (A+) ⊆ A+. Similarly as effects, they
also have to be linear in order to preserve statistical mix-
tures. They cannot increase the total probability, but are
allowed to decrease it (as is the case, for example, for a
filter), thus uA ◦ T (ω) ≤ uA(ω) for all ω ∈ A+.
Instruments1 [84] are collections of transformations
Tj such that
∑
j uA ◦ Tj = uA. If an instrument is ap-
plied to a state ω, one obtains outcome j (and post-
measurement state Tj(ω)/pj) with probability pj :=
uA(Tj(ω)). Each instrument corresponds to a measure-
ment given by the effects uA ◦ Tj . We will say it “in-
duces” this measurement.
The framework of GPTs does not assume a priori that
all mathematically well-defined states, transformations
and measurements can actually be physically imple-
mented. Here, we will assume that a measurement con-
structed from physically allowed effects is also physi-
cally allowed. Moreover, we assume that the set of al-
lowed effects has the same dimension as A+, because
otherwise there would be distinct states that could not
be distinguished by any measurement.
III. VON NEUMANN’S THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
The following thought experiment has been applied
by von Neumann [41] to find a notion of thermody-
namic entropy for quantum states ρ. The result turns out
to equal von Neumann entropy,H(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ). We
apply the thought experiment to a wider class of proba-
bilistic theories.
We adopt the physical picture used by von Neu-
mann [41] to describe the thought experiment2; we will
comment on some idealizations used in this model at
the end of this section. We consider a GPT ensemble
[S1, ..., SN ], where Si denotes the i-th physical system,
and Nj of the systems are in state ωj , where j = 1, . . . , n
and
∑
j Nj = N . This ensemble is described by the state
ω =
∑n
j=1 pjωj , where pj = Nj/N , which describes the
1 Some authors have recently begun referring to instruments as opera-
tions, but long-standing convention in quantum information theory
(including [50]) uses the term “operation” for the quantum case of
what we are calling transformations (which are completely positive
maps). Also, Davies and Lewis [84] define instrument more gener-
ally, to allow for continuously-indexed transformations, where we
only consider finite collections Tj .
2 Our thought experiment is identical to von Neumann’s, up to two
differences: first, we translate all quantum notions to more general
GPT notions; second, while von Neumann implements the transi-
tion from (5) to (6) in Figure 2 via sequences of projections, we im-
plement this transition directly via reversible transformations.
effective state of a system that is drawn uniformly at
random from the ensemble.
We introduce N small, indistinguishable, hollow
boxes3, and we put each ensemble system Sj into one
of the boxes such that the system is completely iso-
lated from the outside. Furthermore, we assume that
the boxes form an ideal gas, which will allow us to use
the ideal gas laws in the following derivation. This gas
will be called the ω-gas. We will denote the total ther-
modynamic entropy of a system by H , with a subscript
which may indicate whether it is the total entropy of a
gas, which potentially depends both on the states of the
GPT systems in the boxes and on the classical degrees of
freedom (positions, momenta) of the boxes, or just the
entropy of the GPT or of the classical degrees of free-
dom.
At first we need to investigate how the entropy of the
gas and of the ensemble are related to each other be-
cause later on, we will only consider the gas. So we
consider also a second GPT ensemble [S′1, ..., S′N ] (de-
scribed by ω′ ∈ ΩA) implanted into a gas the same
way. At temperature T = 0, the movement of the boxes
freezes out and we are left with the GPT ensembles.
In this case, the thermodynamic entropies of the gases
and the GPT ensembles must satisfy: Hω-gas −Hω′-gas =
Hω-ensemble − Hω′-ensemble. Remember that the heat ca-
pacity is C = δQ/dT , and as the gases only differ in
their internal systems, which are isolated, C is the same
for both gases. With dH = δQ/T we thus find that
Hω-gas − Hω′-gas is constant in T , i.e. Hω-gas − Hω′-gas =
Hω-ensemble −Hω′-ensemble for all temperatures.
The central tool for the thought experiment is a semi-
permeable membrane. Whenever a box reaches the
membrane, the membrane opens that box and measures
the internal system. Depending on the result, a win-
dow is opened to let the box pass, or the window re-
mains closed. It is crucial to note that this membrane
will not cause problems in the style of Maxwell’s demon,
as was already discussed by von Neumann himself, be-
cause the membrane does not distinguish between its
two sides.
Now we begin with the experiment itself; see Fig-
ure 2. We consider a state ω =
∑n
j=1 pjωj where ωj are
perfectly distinguishable pure states, and pj = Nj/N ,
where Nj boxes contain a system in the state ωj . We as-
sume that the ω-gas is confined in a container of volume
V . Let there be a second container which is identical to
the first one, but empty. The containers are merged to-
gether, the wall of the non-empty container separating
the containers replaced by a semi-permeable membrane
which lets only ω1 pass. At the opposite wall of the non-
empty container we insert a semi-permeable membrane
which only blocks ω1. The solid wall in the middle and
3 For a more detailed discussion of the physical properties of these
small boxes, we refer the reader to von Neumann‘s original
work [41].
5FIG. 2. This figure shows von Neumann’s thought experiment, as described in the main text. Stages 1)–5) also feature in Petz’ version.
the outer semi-permeable membrane are moved at con-
stant distance until the solid wall hits the other end.
Once this is accomplished, i.e. in stage 4) in Fig. 2, one
container has all ω1-boxes and the other one contains
all the rest. Note that this procedure is possible with-
out performing any work as can be seen via Dalton’s
Law [90]: The work needed to push the semi-permeable
membrane against the ω1-gas can be recollected at the
other side from the moving solid wall, which is pushed
by the ω1-gas into empty space. Thus we have separated
the ω1-boxes from the rest. We repeat a similar proce-
dure until all the ωj-gases are separated into separate
containers of volume V .
Next we compress the containers isothermally to the
volumes pjV , respectively. Denoting the pressure by P ,
and using the ideal gas law, we obtain the required work∫ pjV
V
P dV =
∫ pjV
V
NjkBT/V dV = pjNkBT log pj ,
where log denotes the natural logarithm. As the temper-
ature and thus the internal energy remain constant, we
extract heat NkBT
∑
j pj log pj .
6At this point, we have achieved that every container
contains a pure state ωj . We now transform every ωj
to another pure state ω′ which we choose to be the
same for all containers. This is achieved by opening
the boxes and applying a reversible transformation Tj
in every container j which satisfies Tjωj = ω′. These
transformations exist due to Postulate 1. Since the same
transformation Tj is applied to all small boxes in any
given container j (without conditioning on the content
of the small box), this operation is thermodynamically
reversible.
Now we merge the containers, ending with a pure ω′-
gas in the same condition as the initial ω-gas. This merg-
ing is reversible, because the density is not changed
and because all states are the same, so one can just put
in the walls again. The only step that caused an en-
tropy difference was the isothermal compression. Thus,
the difference of the entropies between the ω-gas and
the ω′-gas (which are equal to the entropies of the re-
spective GPT ensembles) is NkB
∑
j pj log pj . Therefore
Hω-ensemble = Hω′-ensemble − NkB
∑
j pj log pj . If we as-
sume that pure states have entropy zero, we thus end
up with
Hω-ensemble = −NkB
∑
j
pj log pj (1)
and with the following entropy per system of the en-
semble:
H(ω) :=
1
N
Hω-ensemble = −kB
∑
j
pj log pj . (2)
In summary, we have made the following assumptions
to arrive at this notion of thermodynamic entropy:
Assumptions 1. (a) Every (mixed) state can be prepared
as an ensemble/statistical mixture of perfectly distin-
guishable pure states.
(b) A measurement that perfectly distinguishes those pure
states can be implemented as a semi-permeable mem-
brane, which in particular does not disturb the pure
states that it distinguishes.
(c) All pure states can be reversibly transformed into each
other.
(d) Thermodynamical entropyH is continuous in the state.
(Since ensembles must have rational coefficients pj =
Nj/N , we need this to approximate arbitrary states in
the thought experiment.)
(e) All pure states have entropy zero.
A generalized version of the thought experiment pre-
sented by Petz [42] is applicable to more general decom-
positions: suppose that ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ ΩA are perfectly
distinguishable, but not necessarily pure. Let p1, ..., pn
be a probability distribution. Then Petz’ thought exper-
iment implies that
H
∑
j
pjωj
 = ∑
j
pjH(ωj)− kB
∑
j
pj log pj . (3)
The main idea is that steps 1)–5) of von Neumann’s
thought experiment can be run even if the perfectly dis-
tinguishable states ω1, . . . , ωn are mixed and not pure (as
long as the membrane will still keep them undisturbed).
Then the entropy of the state in 5) can be computed by
making an additional extensivity assumption: denote the
GPT entropy of an ω-ensemble of N particles in a vol-
ume V byHω-ensemble(N,V ), then this assumption is that
Hω-ensemble(λN, λV ) = λHω-ensemble(N,V )
for λ ≥ 0. Assuming in addition that the entropy of the
n containers adds up, the total entropy of the configu-
ration in step 5) is N
∑
j pjH(ωj), from which Petz ob-
tains (3). While this approach needs this additional ex-
tensivity assumption, it does not need to postulate that
all pure states can be reversibly transformed into each
other (in contrast to von Neumann’s version). Under
the assumption that all pure states have entropy zero, it
reproduces eq. (2) as a special case.
We conclude this section with a few comments on the
idealizations used in the thought experiments above.
The use of gases in which the exact numbers of parti-
cles with each internal state is known parallels von Neu-
mann’s argument in [41]. We rarely if ever have such
precise knowledge of particle numbers in real physical
gases, so our argument involves a strong idealization,
but one that is common in thermodynamics and that has
also been made by von Neumann.4
Although fluctuations in work are significant for
small particle numbers, in the thermodynamic limit of
large numbers of particles there is concentration about
the expected value given, in von Neumann’s protocol,
by the von Neumann entropy, and therefore our argu-
ments (and von Neumann’s) have the most physical rel-
evance in this large-N situation. This is of course true
4 Here, von Neumann’s thought experiment is formulated in terms of
a frequentist view on probabilities, which is standard in most treat-
ments on thermodynamics. A treatment involving a finite ensemble
where the frequencies (and perhaps the total particle number) are
stochastic might seem more suitable from a Bayesian point of view;
it would likely raise issues about whether the amount of work ex-
tracted from a finite system is subject to fluctuations. For systems
that are finite or out of equilibrium, measures such as Shannon’s are
known not to be the whole story (cf. [30] and references therein).
But even for finite systems with a more realistic treatment of uncer-
tainty about particle numbers, the von Neumann entropy still gives
the expected work in the protocol he considers. We defer these issues
to future work, although we note that [30] suggests the operational
entropies discussed in Section V.6 are among the relevant tools for
tackling them.
7for classical thermodynamics as well—indeed, the use
made of the ideal gas law and Dalton’s law in von Neu-
mann’s argument are additional places where large N
is needed if one wants fluctuations to be negligible. We
expect finer-grained considerations to be required for a
thorough study of fluctuations in finite systems, which
is one reason for interest in the additional entropic mea-
sures studied in Subsection V.6, but von Neumann’s ar-
gument does not concern these finer-grained aspects of
the thermodynamics of finite systems.
IV. WHY THE “GBIT” IS RULED OUT
In Section II, we have introduced the “gbit”, a system
for which the state space Ω is a square. Gbits are partic-
ularly interesting because they correspond to “one half”
of a Popescu-Rohrlich box [83] which exhibits correla-
tions that are stronger than those allowed by quantum
theory [70]. One might wonder whether the thought ex-
periments of Section III allow us to define a notion of
thermodynamic entropy for the gbit. We will now show
that this is not the case, which can be seen as a ther-
modynamical argument for why we do not see super-
strong correlations of the Popescu-Rohrlich type in our
universe.
Since not all states of a gbit can be written as a mix-
ture of perfectly distinguishable pure states, von Neu-
mann’s original thought experiment cannot be of direct
use here. However, we may resort to Petz’ version: ev-
ery mixed state ω of a gbit can be written as a mix-
ture of perfectly distinguishable mixed states, as illus-
trated in Figure 3. Furthermore, the other crucial as-
sumption on the state space is satisfied, too: for every
pair of perfectly distinguishable mixed states, there is
an instrument (a “membrane”) that distinguishes those
states without disturbing them. We even have that all
pure states can be reversibly transformed into each other
(namely by a rotation of the square).
Thus, we can analyze the behavior of a gbit state
space in Petz’ version of the thought experiment. Any
continuous notion of thermodynamic entropy H con-
sistent with this thought experiment would thus have
to satisfy (3). However, we will now show that the
gbit does not admit any notion of entropy that satis-
fies (3). Consider different decompositions of the state
ω = 12ωa +
1
2ωb in the center of the square, where
ωa = pω1 + (1 − p)ω2 as well as ωb = pω3 + (1 − p)ω4.
It is geometrically clear that every choice of 0 < p < 1
corresponds to a valid decomposition. We find (apply-
ing Eq. (3) to ω for the first equality, and to ωa and ωb for
!1 !2
!3!4
!
!a
!b
FIG. 3. In an attempt to define a notion of thermodynamic entropy
for the gbit, we can decompose any state into perfectly distinguish-
able states. This is done in two steps, as explained in the main text.
the second):
H(ω) =
1
2
H(ωa) +
1
2
H(ωb)− 2kB 1
2
log
1
2
=
1
2
pH(ω1) +
1
2
(1− p)H(ω2)
+
1
2
pH(ω3) +
1
2
(1− p)H(ω4)
−kBp log p− kB(1− p) log(1− p) + kB log 2.
This expression can never be constant in p, no matter
what value of entropy of the four pure states H(ωi) we
assume. Thus, the entropy H(ω) of the center state ω is
not well-defined, since it depends on the choice of de-
composition.
In other words, the structure of the gbit state space
enforces that any meaningful notion of thermodynamic
entropy H will not only be a function of the state, but a
function of the ensemble that represents the state. If a state
ω is represented by different ensembles, then this will in
general give different values of entropy.
So what goes wrong for the gbit? Clearly, all we can
say with certainty is that the combination of assump-
tions made in von Neumann’s thought experiment turns
out not to yield a unique notion of entropy, while a
deeper physical interpretation seems only possible un-
der further assumptions on the interplay between the
gbit and the thermodynamic operations. However, a
comparison with quantum theory motivates at least one
further speculative attempt at interpretation. In the ex-
ample above, we have decomposed a state ω into two
perfectly distinguishable states ωa and ωb, which can
themselves be decomposed into pairs of perfectly dis-
tinguishable states ω1 and ω2, or ω3 and ω4 respectively.
In quantum theory, this would only be possible if ωa and
ωb are orthogonal, which would then imply that all four
states ω1, . . . , ω4 are pairwise orthogonal. This would
enforce that there exists a unique projective measure-
ment (a “membrane”) that distinguishes all these four
states jointly. This membrane could feature in von Neu-
mann’s thought experiment (or other similar thermody-
namical settings), yielding a unique notion of thermo-
dynamic entropy.
On the other hand, in the gbit, the four pure
8states ω1, . . . , ω4 are not jointly perfectly distinguishable.
Hence there is no canonical choice of “membrane” that
could be used in the thought experiment to define a
unique natural notion of entropy for the gbit states. En-
tropy will be “contextual”, depending on the choice of
membrane resp. ensemble decomposition that is used in
any given specific thermodynamical setting. Therefore,
the implication “pairwise distinguishability⇒joint distin-
guishability”, which is true for quantum theory, has ther-
modynamic relevance. This implication, if suitably in-
terpreted, leads to the “exclusivity principle” [7, 8, 91],
namely that the sum of the probabilities of pairwise ex-
clusive propositions cannot exceed 1 (in this case these
propositions correspond to the outcomes of the jointly
distinguishing measurement). This suggests that the ex-
clusivity principle, which has so far been considered
only in the realm of contextuality, may be thermody-
namically relevant. This observation is also closely re-
lated to the notion of “dimension mismatch” described
in [82], and to orthomodularity in quantum logic (see for
example [23]).
V. A CLASS OF THEORIES WITH CONSISTENT
THERMODYNAMIC BEHAVIOR
V.1. The two postulates
In this section we introduce the two postulates that
express key operational concepts from thermodynam-
ics. The first postulate is motivated by the universality
of thermodynamics and the distinction between micro-
scopic and macroscopic behaviour. At first we consider
the universality of thermodynamics, in the sense that
thermodynamics is a very general theory whose basic
principles can be applied to many possible implementa-
tions, as already noticed by N. Carnot [44]:
“In order to consider in the most general way the princi-
ple of the production of motion by heat, it must be consid-
ered independently of any mechanism or any particular agent.
It is necessary to establish principles applicable not only to
steam engines but to all imaginable heat-engines, whatever
the working substance and whatever the method by which it
is operated.”
Recalling von Neumann’s thought experiment in the
case of quantum theory, we can think of thermodynami-
cal protocols (which will ultimately also include heat en-
gines) as acting on a given ensemble, defined as a prob-
abilistic mixture of pure states chosen from a fixed basis.
If we interpret ensembles with different choices of basis
as different “working substances”, then Carnot’s prin-
ciple should apply: protocols that can be implemented
on one ensemble (say, ensemble 1) can also be imple-
mented on the other (say, ensemble 2).5 In quantum
5 Here we only consider ensembles of identical Hilbert space dimen-
theory, this universality is ensured by the existence of
unitary transformations: all orthonormal bases can be
translated into each other by a unitary and therefore re-
versible map. In this sense, the state of ensemble 1 can
in principle be transferred to ensemble 2, then the ther-
modynamic protocol of ensemble 2 can be performed (if
we have also transformed the projectors describing the
membranes accordingly), and then one can transform
back. Even if this cannot always be achieved in prac-
tice, the corresponding unitary symmetry of the quan-
tum state space (considered as passive transformations
between different descriptions) enforces the aforemen-
tioned universality.6
This universality of implementation, as well as
independence of the choice of labels and descriptions,
should continue to hold in all generalized theories that
we consider. An orthonormal basis from quantum
theory is nothing else than a set of perfectly distin-
guishable pure states, i.e. an n-frame. Therefore, in our
generalized theories, we expect that this universality
of implementation is achieved by the existence of
reversible transformations that, in analogy to unitary
maps, transform any given n-frame into any other:
Postulate 1: For each n ∈ N, all sets of n perfectly
distinguishable pure states are equivalent. That is, if
{ω1, . . . , ωn} and {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} are two such sets, then
there exists a reversible transformation T with Tωj = ϕj
for all j.
Furthermore, Postulate 1 expresses a physical prop-
erty that is crucial for thermodynamics: that of mi-
croscopic reversibility. Many characteristic properties of
thermodynamics arise from limited experimental ac-
cess to the microscopic degrees of freedom, which by
themselves undergo reversible time evolution. This
reversibility, for example, forbids evolving two mi-
crostates into one, which is at the heart of the non-
decrease of entropy. If the experimenter had full access
to the microscopic degrees of freedom, then he or she
could convert any state of maximal knowledge to any
other one as long as he or she preserved distinguishabil-
ity. Postulate 1 formalizes this microscopic basis of ther-
modynamics by demanding the existence of “enough”
distinguishability-preserving, microscopic transforma-
tions T , which can be understood as reversible time evo-
lutions.
sions. If the dimensions are different (say, 2 versus 3), then one can
implement different sets of protocols on the ensembles (say, ones in-
volving semipermeable membranes that distinguish 3 alternatives
in the latter, but not the former case). One could then still discuss a
notion of universality in Carnot’s spirit, by referring to the equiva-
lence of, say, a state space with N = 3 alternatives to a subspace of
a state space with N = 2 × 2 alternatives, but we will not discuss
this further here.
6 In classical thermodynamics, the analog of a choice of basis is the la-
belling of the distinguishable configurations. Clearly, the availabil-
ity of thermodynamic protocols does not change under relabelling.
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justifications and consequences. The basic concepts of
both thermodynamics and information processing are
independent of the choice of implementation. For in-
formation processing this is formalized by the Turing
machine which admits a multitude of physical realiza-
tions. Perfectly distinguishable pure states can be taken
as bits, and Postulate 1 expresses that all bits (or their
higher-dimensional analogues) are equivalent. It is for
this reason that Postulate 1 was called generalized bit
symmetry in [34], and its restriction to pairs of distin-
guishable states was called bit symmetry in [64]. Starting
with Landauer’s principle, “thermodynamics of compu-
tation” [92] has become a fruitful paradigm that relates
the two apparently disjoint fields. The two complemen-
tary interpretations of Postulate 1 are one instance of
this.
Now we turn to our second postulate. We are looking
for theories very similar to the thermodynamics we are
used to; thus it is essential that we can adopt basic no-
tions of standard thermodynamics unchanged or with
only very small alterations. Two such notions of great
importance are (Shannon) entropy S = −kB
∑
j pj log pj
and majorization theory. In classical and quantum ther-
modynamics, these notions operate on the coefficients
in a decomposition of a state into perfectly distinguish-
able pure states (in quantum theory, the eigenvalues). In
order to not change thermodynamic theory too much,
we would also like this to be possible in our more gen-
eral state spaces. Thus, we demand that every state has
a convex decomposition into perfectly distinguishable
pure states.
Note that this was indeed one of our assumptions
in von Neumann’s thought experiment in Section III.
There, it allowed us to realize any state ω as a “quasiclas-
sical ensemble”, i.e. as an ensemble of states that behave
like classical labels. This gives us a further justification
of our second postulate: thermodynamic (thought)
experiments require that states have an ensemble
interpretation. An unambiguous notion of “counting
of microstates” demands that the ensembles consist
of perfectly distinguishable, pure states. Without
this, obtaining a phenomenological thermodynam-
ics for which the theory is the underlying microscopic
theory seems problematic. Thus, our second postulate is
Postulate 2: Every state ω ∈ ΩA has a convex de-
composition ω =
∑
j pjωj into perfectly distinguishable
pure states ωj .
It is tempting to interpret the two postulates as reflect-
ing the microscopic and the macroscopic aspects of ther-
modynamics, respectively: while Postulate 1 describes
microscopic reversibility of the pure states that may de-
scribe single particles in thermodynamics, Postulate 2
ensures that mixed states can be interpreted macroscop-
ically as descriptions of quasiclassical ensembles, com-
posed of a large number of particles that are separately
in unknown but distinguishable microstates.
We will not introduce any further postulates. In par-
ticular, we will not make any assumptions on the compo-
sition of systems. All our results are therefore indepen-
dent from notions like tomographic locality [51] (which is
arguably dispensable in many important situations [81])
or purification [56] (which is a rather strong assumption);
we do not assume either of the two.
V.2. Some consequences of Postulates 1 and 2
Postulates 1 and 2 have been analyzed in [43], but in
a different context: instead of investigating thermody-
namics, the goal in [43] was to obtain a reconstruction
of quantum theory, by supplementing Postulates 1 and
2 with further postulates. Some of the insights from [43]
will be important here, and are therefore briefly dis-
cussed below. Starting with Subsection V.4, we will also
obtain new results that are interesting in a thermody-
namic context.
In contrast to Hilbert space, there is no apriori notion
of inner product for GPTs. However, as shown in [64],
we get a natural inner product 〈·, ·〉 as a consequence of
Postulates 1 and 2: it satisfies 〈Tω, Tϕ〉 = 〈ω, ϕ〉 for all
reversible transformations T , and 0 ≤ 〈ω, ϕ〉 ≤ 1 for
all states ω, ϕ ∈ ΩA. Furthermore, 〈ω, ω〉 = 1 for all
pure ω ∈ ΩA and 〈ϕ,ϕ〉 < 1 for all mixed ϕ ∈ ΩA, and
〈ω, ϕ〉 = 0 if ω, ϕ ∈ ΩA are perfectly distinguishable.
Thus, all perfectly distinguishable states are orthogonal,
as in quantum theory.
Moreover, the cone of unnormalized states becomes
self-dual with this choice of inner product. In particular,
every effect e can be taken as a vector in A+, such that
e(ω) = 〈e, ω〉. In standard quantum theory, this is the
Hilbert Schmidt inner product on the real vector space
of Hermitian matrices: 〈X,Y 〉 = tr(XY ) for X = X†,
Y = Y †.
Quantum theory has more structure: the convex set
of density matrices ΩA has faces7, and these faces are
in one-to-one correspondence to subspaces of Hilbert
space (namely, a face F contains all density matrices that
have support on the corresponding Hilbert subspace).
To every face F , we can associate a number |F | which
is the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert subspace,
and F ( G implies |F | < |G|. Every face F is gener-
ated by |F | pure and perfectly distinguishable states in
F (an |F |-frame in F ), and every (smaller) frame that is
a subset of F can be completed, or extended, to a frame
which has |F | elements and thus generates F .
In all theories that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2, all
these properties hold in complete analogy [43]. How-
7 A face of a convex set C is a convex subset F ⊆ C with the property
that λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ F with 0 < λ < 1 and x, y ∈ C implies
x, y ∈ F [89]. We say that F is generated by ω1, . . . , ωn if F is the
smallest face that contains ω1, . . . , ωn.
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ever, since faces do not any more correspond to Hilbert
spaces, the numbers |F | do not have an interpretation
as the dimension of a subspace. Instead, we call |F |
the rank of F . If von Neumann’s thought experiment
is supposed to make sense for these theories, we need a
way to formalize the working of a semipermeable mem-
brane, which in quantum theory is done via projective
measurements.
Since we are dealing with unnormalized states, the
corresponding analog in GPTs will be formulated in
terms of the set of unnormalized states A+. As one can
see in the case of the gbit, it is not automatic that we
have any notion of “projective measurements” for any
given state space. However, Postulates 1 and 2 turn out
to ensure that projective measurements exist. For any
face F of A+ (the non-negative multiples of the corre-
sponding face of ΩA), consider the orthogonal projector
PF onto the span of F . One can show that PF is posi-
tive, i.e. maps (unnormalized) states to (unnormalized)
states [43]. Moreover, PF does not disturb the states in
the face F .
Thus, to a given set of mutually orthogonal faces
F1, . . . , Fm such that |F1| + . . . + |Fm| = NA, we can
associate an instrument with transformations Ti := PFi ,
which describes a projective measurement, as in a
semipermeable membrane. Transformation Ti leaves
the states in face Fi unperturbed, but fully blocks out
states in the other faces, i.e. Tiω = 0 for ω ∈ Fj , i 6= j.
In standard quantum theory, these transformations
are PFiρ = piiρpii, where pii is the orthogonal Hilbert
space projector onto the i-th Hilbert subspace. The rank
condition becomes tr(pi1) + . . .+ tr(pim) = NA (the total
Hilbert space dimension), and mutual orthogonality is
piipij = δijpii. We will show in Subsection V.4 that the
mutually orthogonal faces replace the eigenspaces from
quantum theory and that the projective measurement
described here can be interpreted as measuring an
observable.
The Hilbert space projector pii therefore also has an in-
terpretation as an effect in standard quantum theory: it
yields the probability of outcome i in the projective mea-
surement on a state ρ, namely tr(piiρ). The analogous
effect in a GPT that satisfies Postulates 1 and 2, corre-
sponding to a face F , is
uF := PFuA
(identifying the effect uA with a vector via the inner
product). The effect uF is sometimes called the “pro-
jective unit” of F . In quantum theory, we can write
pii =
∑
j |ψj〉〈ψj |, where the |ψj〉 are an orthonormal
basis of the corresponding Hilbert subspace. The same
turns out to be true in our GPTs: we have
uF =
|F |∑
j=1
ωi, (4)
where ω1, . . . , ω|F | is any frame that generates F . There-
fore, the probability to obtain outcome i in the projective
measurement above on state ω is 〈uFi , ω〉 = 〈uA, PFiω〉.
V.3. State spaces satisfying Postulates 1 and 2
It is easy to see that both quantum and classical state
spaces satisfy Postulates 1 and 2. By a “classical state
space”, we mean a state space that consists of discrete
probability distributions. Concretely, for any number
N ∈ N of mutually exclusive alternatives, consider the
state space
Ω := {(p1, . . . , pN ) | pi ≥ 0,
∑
i
pi = 1}.
Any pure state is given by a deterministic probability
vector, i.e. ωi = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (where 1 is on the i-
th place). If we have two equally sized sets of such vec-
tors (as in Postulate 1), then there is always a permuta-
tion that maps one set to the other. In fact, the reversible
transformations correspond to the permutations of the
entries. Postulate 2 is then simply the statement that
(p1, . . . , pN ) = p1ω1 + p2ω2 + . . .+ pNωN .
Which state spaces are there, in addition to standard
complex quantum theory and classical probability the-
ory, that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2? We think that this
question is very difficult to answer. Thus, we formulate
the following
Open Problem 1. Classify all state spaces that satisfy
Postulates 1 and 2.
From the results in [43], we know which state spaces
satisfy Postulates 1 and 2 and one additional prop-
erty: the absence of third-order interference. The no-
tion of higher-order interference has been introduced by
Sorkin [76], and has since been the subject of intense the-
oretical [93, 95, 96] and experimental [97–102] interest.
For the main idea, think of three mutually exclusive
alternatives in quantum theory (such as three slits in a
triple-slit experiment), described by orthogonal projec-
tors pi1, pi2, pi3. The event that alternative 1 or alternative
2 takes place is described by the projector pi12 = pi1 + pi2;
similarly, we have pi13, pi23 and pi123. Their actions on
density matrices are described by superoperators
ρ 7→ P12(ρ) := pi12ρpi12
(and similarly for the other projectors). As a conse-
quence, we obtain that P12 6= P1 + P2, which expresses
the phenomenon of interference. However, it is easy to
check that
P123 = P12 + P13 + P23 − P1 − P2 − P3, (5)
which means that interference over three alternatives
can be reduced to contributions from interferences of
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pairs of alternatives. Similar identities hold for an ar-
bitrary number n ≥ 4 of alternatives: quantum theory
admits only pairwise interference, and no “third-order in-
terference” which would be characterized by a violation
of this equality.
In the context of Postulates 1 and 2, we have an anal-
ogous notion of orthogonal projectors, and thus we can
consider (5) and its generalization to n ≥ 4 alternatives
on a state space with N ≥ n perfectly distinguishable
states. Postulating this “absence of third-order interfer-
ence” in addition to Postulates 1 and 2 gives us the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 2 (Lemma 33 in [43]). The possible state spaces
which satisfy Postulates 1 and 2 and which do not admit
third-order interference, in addition to classical state spaces,
are the following. First, for N ≥ 4 perfectly distinguishable
states, there are only three possibilities:
• Standard complex quantum theory.
• Quantum theory over the real numbers. That is, only
real entries are allowed in the N ×N density matrices.
• Quantum theory over the quaternions. The state spaces
are the self-adjointN×N quaternionic matrices of unit
trace.
For N = 3 perfectly distinguishable states, all of the above
and one exceptional solution are possible, namely quantum
theory over the octonions (but only for the case of 3 × 3 unit
trace density matrices).
For N = 2 (the “bit” case), we have the d-dimensional
Bloch ball state spaces Ωd := {(1, r)T |r ∈ Rd, ‖r‖ ≤ 1} with
d ≥ 2. They are analogous to the standard Bloch ball Ω3 of
quantum theory, with very similar descriptions of effects etc.
Their group of reversible transformations may either be SO(d)
(which corresponds to PU(2) for d = 3), or some subgroup
of O(d) which is transitive on the sphere (such as SU(2) for
d = 4).
Mathematically, these examples correspond to the
state spaces of the finite-dimensional irreducible for-
mally real Jordan algebras [24, 43]. We do not know
whether there are theories that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2
but admit higher-order interference and therefore do not
appear on this list. In Theorem 12, we will show that the
question whether a theory has third-order interference
is related to the properties of its Re´nyi entropies.
V.4. Observables and diagonalization
A central part of physics are observables and how
they can be measured. In standard quantum theory, we
can introduce observables in two different ways, which
both equivalently lead to the prescription that observ-
ables are described by Hermitian operators/matrices.
First, in finite dimensions, we can characterize observ-
ables as those objects that linearly assign real expectation val-
ues to states. In the case of quantum theory it follows that
observables are represented by matrices X , and Her-
miticity X = X† implies that expectation values tr(ρX)
are always real. Linearity is enforced by the statistical
interpretation of states, for the same reason that effects
in GPTs are linear.
Second, we can introduce observables by saying
that there is a projective measurement pi1, . . . , pin that
measures this observable, and which has outcomes
x1, . . . , xn ∈ R. This leads to the Hermitian operator
X =
∑n
i=1 xipii. Since every Hermitian operator can be
diagonalized, these two definitions are equivalent.
Our two postulates provide the structure to introduce
observables in a completely analogous way. First, using
the inner product, we can define observables as linear
maps of the form
ω 7→ 〈x, ω〉
and thus identify them with elements x ∈ A of the vec-
tor space that carries the states (as in quantum theory,
where this vector space is the space of Hermitian matri-
ces). As noticed in [62], every such vector has a repre-
sentation of the form
x =
∑
i
xiui, (6)
where the ui are projective units corresponding to mu-
tually orthogonal faces Fi, xi ∈ R, and xi 6= xj for
i 6= j. The analogy with quantum theory goes even fur-
ther: due to (4), we have x =
∑
i xi
∑
j ω
(j)
i , whenever
ω
(1)
i , . . . , ω
(|Fi|)
i is a frame on Fi. This corresponds to the
identity X =
∑
i xi
∑
j |ψ(j)i 〉〈ψ(j)i | in standard quantum
theory. In analogy to quantum theory we will call the Fi
eigenfaces and the xi eigenvalues. To further justify this
terminology, note that the xi are eigenvalues of the map∑
i xiPi, where Pi are the orthogonal projectors onto the
spans of the faces Fi.
Theorem 3. If Postulates 1 and 2 hold, then every element
x ∈ A has a representation of the form x = ∑nj=1 xjuj where
xj ∈ R are pairwise different and the uj are the projective
units of pairwise orthogonal faces Fj such that
∑
j uj = uA.
This decomposition x =
∑n
j=1 xjuj is unique up to rela-
belling. In analogy to quantum theory, we will call the xj
eigenvalues and the Fj eigenfaces.
Furthermore, for every real function f with suitable do-
main of definition, we can define
f(x) :=
n∑
j=1
f(xj)uj (7)
as in spectral calculus.
If Pj is the orthogonal projector onto the span of Fj , then
(P1, ..., Pn) is a well-defined instrument with induced mea-
surement (u1, ..., un) which leaves the elements of span(Fj)
invariant:
Pj(ω) = δjk · ω for all ω ∈ Fk.
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In analogy to quantum theory, we will call this instrument
the projective measurement of the observable x.
We will give a proof in the appendix.8 Eq. (7) allows
us to define a notion of entropy, in full analogy to quan-
tum mechanics.
Definition 4 (Spectral entropy). If A is a state space that
satisfies Postulates 1 and 2, we define the spectral entropy
for any state ω ∈ ΩA as
S(ω) := −
∑
i
pi log pi,
where ω =
∑
i piωi is any convex decomposition of ω into
pure and perfectly distinguishable states ωi, and 0 log 0 := 0.
Theorem 3 tells us that this definition is independent
of the choice of decomposition: it is easy to check that
S(ω) = −〈ω, logω〉,
where logω is understood in the sense of spectral cal-
culus as in (7). The right-hand side is manifestly in-
dependent of the decomposition. It can also be written
S(ω) = uA(η(ω)), where η(x) = −x log x for x > 0 and
η(0) = 0. In particular,
ω is a pure state ⇔ S(ω) = 0. (8)
To see this, note that any pure state ω1 = ω can be ex-
tended to a set of perfectly distinguishable pure states
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωNA such that ω = 1 ·ω1 +0 ·ω2 + . . .+0 ·ωNA .
Conversely, if S(ω) = 0, then any decomposition of ω
must have coefficients (1, 0, . . . , 0).
V.5. Thermodynamics in the context of Postulates 1 and 2
If a state space satisfies Postulates 1 and 2, then it also
satisfies all the assumptions that we have made in von
Neumann’s thought experiment. It is easy to check all
items in Assumptions 1: (a) is simply Postulate 2, and (c)
is a consequence of Postulate 1. As we have seen in the
previous section, our two postulates imply that we have
orthogonal projectors sharing important properties with
those of standard quantum theory. If we make the phys-
ical assumption that we can actually implement them
by means of semipermeable membranes (as in quantum
theory), we obtain (b). Item (e) is the same as (8). Note
that assumption (d) is not a mathematical assumption
about the state space, but a physical assumption about
thermodynamic entropy. This shows part of the follow-
ing (the full proof will be given in the appendix):
8 This can also also obtained by combining the fact that Postulates
1 and 2 imply the state space is projective (first part of Theorem
17 in [43]) and self-dual (Proposition 3 in [43]) with results such as
Theorem 8.64 in [24].
Observation 5. Von Neumann’s thought experiment, as ex-
plained in Section III, can be run for every state space that
satisfies Postulates 1 and 2. The notion of thermodynamic en-
tropy H that one obtains from that thought experiment turns
out to equal spectral entropy S as given in Definition 4,
H(ω) = S(ω) for all states ω.
This is consistent with Assumptions 1. Furthermore, it is
also consistent with Petz’ version of the thought experiment,
because spectral entropy satisfies
S(ω) =
∑
j
pjS(ωj)−
∑
j
pj log pj (9)
for every convex decomposition ω =
∑
j pjωj of ω into per-
fectly distinguishable, not necessarily pure states ωj .
Thus, spectral entropy S gives meaningful and con-
sistent physical predictions in situations like von Neu-
mann’s and Petz’ thought experiments. However, we
clearly do not know whether S is a consistent notion of
physical entropy in all thermodynamical situations.
It turns out that there are further properties of S
that encourage its physical interpretation as a ther-
modynamical entropy. In particular, we will now
show that the second law holds in two important sit-
uations. We start by considering projective mea-
surements P1, . . . , Pn. Projective measurements can
model semipermeable membranes as in von Neumann’s
thought experiment, or they describe the measurement
of an observable as explained in Subsection V.4. Con-
sider the action of this measurement on a given state
ω. With probabilities (uA ◦ Pj) (ω), this measurement
yields the outcome j with post-measurement state ωj :=
Pjω/ (uA ◦ Pj(ω)). Performing this measurement on ev-
ery particle of an ensemble (without learning the out-
comes) yields a new ensemble, described by the post-
measurement state
ω′ =
∑
j: uA◦Pj(ω)6=0
(
uA ◦ Pj
)
(ω) · ωj =
∑
j
Pjω.
Projective measurements do not decrease the entropy
of the ensemble:
Theorem 6. Suppose Postulates 1 and 2 are satisfied. Let
P1, . . . , Pn be orthogonal projectors which form a valid
instrument. Then the induced measurement with post-
measurement ensemble state ω′ =
∑
j Pjw does not decrease
entropy: S(ω′) ≥ S(ω).
The proof will be given in the appendix. As in stan-
dard quantum theory, projectors Pj form a valid instru-
ment if and only if they are mutually orthogonal, i.e.
PiPj = δijPi, and complete:
∑
i uA ◦ Pi = uA.
Another important manifestation of the second law
is in mixing procedures as in Figure 4. Consider tanks
that are separated by walls. Similarly to von Neumann’s
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FIG. 4. A process mixing gases by removing a separating wall. Theorem 7 ensures that this process does not decrease entropy, i.e. ∆H ≥ 0, if
thermodynamic entropy H is identified with spectral entropy S as suggested by von Neumann’s thought experiment.
thought experiment, let the j-th tank contain an Nj -
particle gas that represents an ωj-ensemble. Further-
more, assume that all the gases are at the same pres-
sure and density. Identifying thermodynamic entropy
H with spectral entropy S (as suggested by Observa-
tion 5), the entropy of the GPT-ensemble in tank j is
NjS(ωj), where S is the entropy per system. Thus the
total GPT-entropy is
∑
j NjS(ωj). We remove the walls
and let the gases mix. Then we put the walls back in.
Now all the tanks contain gases hosting
∑
j
Nj
N ωj en-
sembles at the same conditions as before, where N =∑
j Nj . The total GPT-entropy in the end is given by∑
j NjS
(∑
k
Nk
N ωk
)
= NS
(∑
k
Nk
N ωk
)
. As the gases
in the tanks have the same density, volume, tempera-
ture and pressure as before, the only difference in en-
tropy is due to the GPT-ensembles. The second law re-
quires that the entropy does not decrease in this pro-
cess, i.e. that
∑
j NjS(ωj) ≤ NS
(∑
j
Nj
N ωj
)
and thus∑
j
Nj
N S(ωj) ≤ S
(∑
j
Nj
N ωj
)
. The following theorem
shows that our two postulates guarantee that this is true:
Theorem 7. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Then entropy is
concave, i.e. for ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ ΩA and p1, ..., pn a probability
distribution, we have
S
∑
j
pjwj
 ≥∑
j
pjS(wj). (10)
Thus, the second law automatically holds for mix-
ing processes. One way to prove (10) is to see that S
equals “measurement entropy” as we will show in Sub-
section V.6, proven to be concave in [66] and [67]. How-
ever, there is a simpler proof that uses a notion of relative
entropy, which is an important notion in its own right.
Definition 8. For state spacesA that satisfy Postulates 1 and
2, we define the relative entropy of two states ω, ϕ ∈ ΩA as
S(ω‖ϕ) := −S(ω)− 〈ω, logϕ〉 .
Here, for ϕ =
∑
j qjϕj any decomposition into a maximal
frame, logϕ =
∑
j log(qj)ϕj according to Theorem 3. (As in
quantum theory, this can be infinite if there are qj = 0 such
that 〈ω, ϕj〉 6= 0).
A notion of relative entropy in GPTs has also been de-
fined in Scandolo’s Master thesis [48], but under differ-
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ent assumptions, as discussed in the introduction. Rela-
tive entropy continues to satisfy Klein’s inequality, a fact
that is useful in proving Theorem 7. The proof is similar
to that within standard quantum theory and deferred to
the appendix.
Theorem 9 (Klein’s inequality). For all ω, ϕ ∈ ΩA,
S(ω‖ϕ) ≥ 0.
Klein’s inequality can be used to give a simple proof
of Theorem 7:
0 ≤
∑
j
pjS
(
ωj‖
∑
k
pkωk
)
= −
∑
j
pjS(ωj)−
〈∑
j
pjωj , log
(∑
k
pkωk
)〉
= −
∑
j
pjS(ωj) + S
(∑
k
pkωk
)
.
Given all the calculations in this subsection in terms of
orthogonal projections, it may seem at first sight as if
every statement or calculation in quantum theory can
be analogously made in the more general state spaces
that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2. However, this may not
quite be true, as the fact that the following is an open
problem shows:
Open Problem 2. For state spaces satisfying Postulates 1
and 2, if ω is a pure state, and P an orthogonal projection,
then is Pω also (up to normalization) a pure state?
In classical and quantum state spaces, the answer is
“yes”, but we do not know if a positive answer follows
from Postulates 1 and 2 alone. We will return to this
problem in Theorem 12.
Note that Chiribella and Scandolo have applied sim-
ilar techniques and found beautiful results, including
some which are comparable to some of ours, in [45, Sec-
tion 7] (see also [48]). They derive diagonalizability of
states from a very different set of postulates.
V.6. Information-theoretic entropies and their relation to
physics
So far we have considered entropy from a thermody-
namic perspective. But entropies also arise in informa-
tion theory, and as the GPT framework is mostly studied
in quantum information theory, indeed there have been
many results on entropy from a information-theoretic
perspective. Our exposition will mainly follow [66],
but has also been given in a slightly different formalism
in [67].
Let e = (e1, ..., en) and f = (f1, ..., fm) be two mea-
surements such that there exists a map M : {1, ..., n} →
e1 + e3 + e5 = f1 e2 + e4 = f2
e
1
3
4
5
w
1, 3, 5
2, 4
e
f
1
w⇒2
2
FIG. 5. A coarse-graining of a measurement is created by having
several measurement results trigger the same output.
{1, ...,m}with∑
{j|M(j)=k}
ej = fk (k = 1, . . . ,m).
If M is bijective, then the measurement f is simply a re-
labelling of e. If there exists a k with M(j) 6= k ∀j, then
because of the normalization of the e-measurement,
fk = 0, i.e. fk corresponds to a trivial outcome that never
happens. If M is not injective, then f is a coarse-graining
of e (or vice versa, e a refinement of f ) in the sense that
f is obtained from e by collecting several outcomes of e
and giving them a common new outcome label (and by
possibly adding the 0-effect a few times), see Figure 5.
In this sense, we do not care about which of the ej trig-
gered the new effect.
However, there exist trivial refinements/coarse-
grainings: for those, ej ∝ fM(j) ∀j. We write ej =
pjfM(j). Then such a measurement can be obtained by
performing f , and if outcome k is triggered, we activate
a classical random number generator which generates
the final outcome j among those j with M(j) = k with
probability
pj∑
{a|M(a)=k} pa
.
Thus, a trivial refinement does not yield any additional
information about the GPT-system. We call a measure-
ment fine-grained if it does not have any non-trivial re-
finements. The set of fine-grained measurements on any
state space A is denoted E∗A.
Now we consider the Re´nyi entropies [65], which are
defined for probability distributions p = (p1, . . . , pn) as
Hα(p) =
1
1− α log
∑
j
pαj
 ,
where α ∈ (0,∞) \ {1}. Furthermore,
H0(p) := lim
α→0
Hα(p) = log |supp(p)|
with supp(p) = {pj | pj > 0} is called the max-entropy,
and
H∞(p) := lim
α→∞Hα(p) = − log maxj pj
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is called the min-entropy. Also,
H1(p) := lim
α→1
Hα(p) = −
∑
j
pj log pj = H(p)
is just the regular Shannon entropy H .
For α ∈ [0,∞] and GPTs satisfying Postulates 1 and 2,
we generalize the classical Re´nyi entropies:
Sα(ω) := Hα(p),
where ω =
∑
j pjwj is any decomposition into perfectly
distinguishable pure states. According to Theorem 3,
the result is independent of the choice of decomposition.
We have S1 = S, the spectral entropy of Definition 4.
Following [66], for every α ∈ [0,∞] and ω ∈ ΩA, we
define the order-α Re´nyi measurement entropy as
Ŝα(ω) = inf
e∈E∗A
Hα
(
e1(ω), e2(ω), . . .
)
,
where Hα on the right-hand side denotes the classical
Re´nyi entropy. The order-α Re´nyi decomposition entropy is
defined as
Sˇα(ω) := inf
ω=
∑
j qjϕj
Hα(q), (11)
where the infimum is over all convex decompositions of
ω into pure states ϕj ∈ ΩA.
The idea of measurement entropy is to characterize
the state before a measurement. For example, in quan-
tum theory, particles prepared in a state |ψ〉 which all
give the same result in energy measurements would be
said to be in an energy eigenstate. If instead we per-
formed a position measurement, the resulting distribu-
tion of positions would have non-zero entropy. How-
ever, this entropy would arguably not come from the
initial state, but from the measurement process itself due
to the uncertainty principle.
Suppose we would like to prepare a state ω by using
states of maximal knowledge (i.e. pure states) ϕj , and
a random number generator which gives output j with
probability pj . Then the decomposition entropy quanti-
fies the smallest information content (entropy) of a ran-
dom number generator that would be necessary to build
such a device. For more detailed operational interpre-
tations of measurement and decomposition entropy, in
particular for α = 1, see [66, 67] Note that in quantum
theory, measurement, decomposition and spectral Re´nyi
entropies all coincide, with the α = 1 case giving von
Neumann entropy, S(ω) = −tr(ω logω).
Our first result is that the spectral and measurement
definitions of the entropies agree:
Theorem 10. Consider any state space A which satisfies
Postulates 1 and 2. Then the Re´nyi entropies Sα and the
Re´nyi measurement entropies Ŝα coincide, and upper-bound
the Re´nyi decomposition entropy Sˇα, i.e.
Sˇα(ω) ≤ Sα(ω) = Ŝα(ω) for all ω ∈ ΩA, α ∈ [0,∞].
In particular, for α = 1, the measurement entropy Ŝ is the
same as the spectral entropy S from Definition 4, which we
have identified with thermodynamical entropy H in Observa-
tion 5.
The inequality Sˇα ≤ Sα is easy to see: for a decom-
position ω =
∑
i piωi into perfectly distinguishable pure
states ωi, the states ωi can also be seen as a fine-grained
measurement, yielding outcome probabilities pi. So tak-
ing the infimum over all decompositions gives at most
Hα(p) = Sα(ω). The equality between Sα and Ŝα is
shown in the appendix.
We do not know in general whether Postulates 1 and
2 imply that Sˇα = Sα for all α. Interestingly, we know it
for α = 2 and α =∞:
Theorem 11. If a state space satisfies Postulates 1 and 2,
then Sˇ2(ω) = S2(ω) and Sˇ∞(ω) = S∞(ω) for all states ω.
Proof. To give the reader an idea of the kind of argu-
ments involved, we present the proof for S2, but defer
the proof for S∞ to the appendix. If ω =
∑
j pjωj is any
convex decomposition into a maximal set of perfectly
distinguishable pure states (without loss of generality
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . .), and ω =
∑
j qjϕj any (other) convex de-
composition into pure states ϕj (also with q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . .),
then
∑
j p
2
j = 〈ω, ω〉 =
∑
j q
2
j +
∑
j 6=k qjqk 〈ϕj , ϕk〉 ≥∑
j q
2
j since 〈ϕj , ϕk〉 ≥ 0. Thus, we have
S2(ω) = − log
∑
j
p2j ≤ − log
∑
j
q2j = H2(q),
and since Sˇ2(ω) is defined as the infimum over the right-
hand side, we obtain that Sˇ2(ω) ≥ S2(ω); we find the
converse inequality in Theorem 10.
We do not know whether the same identity holds for
the most interesting case α = 1, the case of standard
thermodynamic entropy S = S1. In the max-entropy
case α = 0, however, we have a surprising relation to
higher-order interference:
Theorem 12. Consider a state space satisfying Postulates 1
and 2. Then the following statements are all equivalent:
(i) The state space does not have third-order interference.
(ii) The measurement and decomposition versions of max-
entropy coincide, i.e. Sˇ0(ω) = S0(ω) for all states ω.
(iii) The state space is either classical, or one on the list of
Theorem 2.
(iv) If ω is a pure state and PF any orthogonal projection
onto any face F , then PFω is a multiple of a pure state.
(v) The “atomic covering property” of quantum logic holds.
The equivalences (i) ⇔ (iii) ⇔ (iv) ⇔ (v) are shown
in [43]; our new result is the equivalence to (ii), which is
shown in the appendix.
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Absence of third-order interference is meant in the
sense of eq. (5), as introduced originally by Sorkin [76]:
only pairs of mutually exclusive alternatives can pos-
sibly interfere. It is interesting that this is related to
an information-theoretic property of max-entropy S0, as
given in (ii). We do not currently know whether S0 (or,
in particular, the identity of Sˇ0 and S0) has any thermo-
dynamic relevance in the class of theories that we are
considering, but it certainly does within quantum the-
ory, where it attains operational meaning in single-shot
thermodynamics [28, 29].
As (iii) shows, this theorem is closely related to Open
Problem 1: it gives properties of conceivable state spaces
that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2, but are not on the list
of known examples (namely, they do not satisfy any of
(i) − (v)). Similarly, (iv) shows the relation of higher-
order interference to Open Problem 2, and (v) relates all
these items to quantum logic. In fact, one can show that
Postulates 1 and 2 imply that the set of faces of the state
space has the structure of an orthomodular lattice, which
is often seen as the definition of quantum logic. For
readers who are familiar with the terminology of quan-
tum logic, we give some additional remarks in Subsec-
tion VII.2 in the appendix.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in the introduction, many works (dat-
ing back at least to the 1950s) have considered quan-
tum theory as just one particular example of a proba-
bilistic theory: a single point in a large space of the-
ories that contains classical probability theory, as well
as many other possibilities that are non-quantum and
non-classical. More recent works have focused on the
information-theoretic properties of quantum theory, for
example deriving quantum theory as the unique struc-
ture that satisfies a number of information-theoretic pos-
tulates.
Rather than attempt a derivation of quantum theory
from postulates, this paper has examined the thermody-
namic properties of quantum theory and of those the-
ories that are similar enough to quantum theory to ad-
mit a good definition of thermodynamic entropy, and
of some version of the Second Law. Postulate 1 states
that there is a reversible transformation between any
two sets of n distinguishable pure states. This can be
thought of as an expression of the universality of the
representation of information, in particular that a choice
of basis is arbitrary, and also allows for reversible mi-
croscopic dynamics, as is crucial for thermodynamics.
Postulate 2 states that every state can be written as a
convex mixture of perfectly distinguishable pure states.
This ensures that a mixed state describing an ensemble
of many particles can be treated as if each particle has an
unknown microstate, drawn from a set of distinguish-
able possibilities.
Much follows from Postulates 1 and 2, without need-
ing to assume any other aspects of the standard formal-
ism of quantum theory. In order to derive thermody-
namic conclusions, we considered the argument origi-
nally employed by von Neumann in his derivation of
the mathematical expression for the thermodynamic en-
tropy of a quantum state. The argument involves a
thought experiment with a gas of quantum particles
in a box, and semi-permeable membranes that allow a
particle to pass or not depending on the outcome of a
quantum measurement. By applying the same thought
experiment, we showed that given any theory satisfy-
ing Postulates 1 and 2, there is a unique expression for
the the thermodynamic entropy, equal to both the spec-
tral entropy and the measurement entropy. By way of
contrast, a fictitious system defined by a square state
space, which arises as Alice’s local system of an entan-
gled pair producing stronger-than-quantum “PR box”
correlations, does not satisfy either Postulate. This sys-
tem – the gbit – does not admit a sensible notion of ther-
modynamic entropy, at least not one that is given to it
by the von Neumann or Petz arguments. While many
works have discussed the inability of quantum theory
to produce arbitrarily strong nonlocal correlations, this
connection with thermodynamics deserves further in-
vestigation. It would be very interesting, for example,
if Tsirelson’s bound on the strength of quantum nonlo-
cal correlations could be derived from a thermodynamic
argument.
There are many other consequences of Postulates
1 and 2 for both thermodynamic and information-
theoretic entropies. For example, a form of the Second
Law holds in that neither projective measurements nor
mixing procedures can decrease the thermodynamic en-
tropy. The spectral and measurement order-α Renyi en-
tropies coincide for any α. The spectral and decom-
position order-α Renyi entropies coincide for α = 2 or
∞. An open question is whether any theory satisfying
Postulates 1 and 2 is completely satisfactory from the
thermodynamic point of view. While the von Neumann
and Petz arguments can be run with no trouble in the
presence of Postulates 1 and 2 as we have shown, there
could still be a different physical scenario, in which
theories would fail to exhibit sensible behaviour unless
they have even more of the structure of quantum theory.
Finally, another major open question is whether
quantum-like theories exist, satisfying Postulates 1 and
2, that are distinct from quantum theory in that they ad-
mit higher-order interference. Roughly speaking, this
means that three or more possibilities can interfere in
order to produce an overall amplitude, unlike in quan-
tum theory, where different possibilities only interfere
in pairs. We extend the results of Ref. [43], where it
was shown that in the context of Postulates 1 and 2 the
existence of higher-order interference is equivalent to
each of three other statements. We provide an equiv-
alent entropic condition: there is higher-order interfer-
ence if and only if the measurement and decomposition
versions of the max entropy do not coincide.
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Our understanding of quantum theory would be
greatly improved if higher-order interference could be
ruled out by simple information-theoretic, thermody-
namic, or other physical arguments. On the other hand,
if theories with higher-order interference exist and are
eminently sensible, an immediate question is whether
an experimental test could be performed to distinguish
such a theory from quantum theory. While previous
experiments [97–102] only tested for a zero versus
non-zero value of higher-order interference, sensible
higher-order theories that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2 (if
they exist) could help to inform future experiments by
supplying concrete models that can be tested against
standard quantum theory.
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VII. APPENDIX
VII.1. Proofs
VII.1.1. Proof that observables are well-defined
In this appendix, a decomposition of a state into perfectly distinguishable pure states (which always exists due to
Postulate 2) will be called a “classical decomposition”.
Lemma 13. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Let F 6= {0} be a face of A+ and ω ∈ ΩA ∩ F . Then there exists a classical
decomposition ω =
∑
j pjωj with ωj ∈ F for all j.
Proof. Let ω =
∑
j pjωj be a classical decomposition with pj 6= 0. As ω ∈ F and F a face, ωj ∈ F for all j.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let x ∈ A be arbitrary. By Lemma 5.46 from [62] there exists a frame {ωj} and x′j ∈ R such that
x =
∑
j x
′
jωj . We extend {ωj} to a maximal frame by adding x′j := 0 for the new indices j. Now we group together
the j with the same x′j value, and by relabelling we find that x =
∑n
k=1 xk
∑
i ωk;i where the xk are pairwise different
values of the x′j and the ωk;i are the ωj that belong to this x
′
j value. For any given k, the ωk;i generate a face Fk with
projective unit uk =
∑
i ωk;i.
Therefore we find a decomposition x =
∑n
k=1 xkuk with xk pairwise different real numbers and uk order units of
faces Fk and
∑n
k=1 uk = uA.
Now we show that the faces Fk are mutually orthogonal:
Let ω ∈ Fk be an arbitrary normalized state. By Lemma 13 it has a classical decomposition ω =
∑
j pjω
(k)
j which
uses only pure states ω(k)j ∈ Fk. Wlog we assume that these pure states form a generating frame of Fk, by extending
the frame and adding pj = 0 to the decomposition. Consider another face Fm, i.e. m 6= k. Likewise to ω, let ω′ ∈ Fm
be an arbitrary normalized state and ω′ =
∑
j qjω
(m)
j be a classical decomposition with ω
(m)
j a generating frame for
Fm. For the other faces define ω
(i)
j := ωi;j . Then ui =
∑
j ω
(i)
j and in total uA =
∑
i ui =
∑
i
∑
j ω
(i)
j . As 〈ν, ν〉 = 1 for
all pure states ν ∈ ΩA, this implies that the ω(i)j are mutually orthogonal:
1 = uA(ω
(g)
h ) =
∑
i
∑
j
〈ω(i)j , ω(g)h 〉 = 1 +
∑
(i,j)6=(g,h)
〈ω(i)j , ω(g)h 〉
and therefore 〈ω(i)j , ω(g)h 〉 ≥ 0 implies 〈ω(i)j , ω(g)h 〉 = 0 for all (i, j) 6= (g, h). Thus we find 〈ω, ω′〉 =∑
j
∑
b pjqb 〈ω(k)j , ω(m)b 〉 = 0 because m 6= k. As ω ∈ Fk and ω′ ∈ Fm were arbitrary (normalized) states, this
implies that Fk and Fm are orthogonal. As k 6= m were arbitrary, all the faces are mutually orthogonal.
Now we will show that the decomposition x =
∑
j xjuj is unique. So assume there are two decompositions
x =
∑na
j=1 aju
(a)
j =
∑nb
j=1 bju
(b)
j with aj ∈ R pairwise different and projective units u(a)j that add up to the order unit
(analogously for b) and belong to pairwise orthogonal faces F (a)j . Wlog we assume that the aj and bj are ordered by
size, i.e. a1 < a2 < ... < ana . We want to show a1 = b1. The u
(a)
j generate the faces F
(a)
j . Let ω
(a)
j;i be a generating
frame for the face F (a)j , especially
∑
i ω
(a)
j;i = u
(a)
j . As the faces are mutually orthogonal and the projective units add
up to uA, the ω
(a)
j;i form a maximal frame; in particular they add up to uA (likewise for b). Therefore:
a1 = 〈ω(a)1;j , x〉 =
∑
k,i
bk 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 ≥
∑
k,i
b1 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 = b1uA(ω(a)1;j ) = b1.
Analogously show b1 ≥ a1, i.e. b1 = a1 in total.
Now suppose there was a k > 1 and an i with 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 6= 0, i.e. 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 > 0. Then
a1 = 〈ω(a)1;j , x〉 =
∑
k,i
bk 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 = a1
∑
i
〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)1;i 〉+
∑
k>1,i
bk 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 > a1
∑
i
〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)1;i 〉+
∑
k>1,i
a1 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉
= a1
∑
k,i
〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 = a1uA(ω(a)1;j ) = a1.
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This is a contradiction. Thus 〈ω(a)1;j , ω(b)k;i〉 = 0 for all k > 1 and i. Therefore we find u(b)1 (ω(a)1;i ) =
∑
j〈ω(b)1;j , ω(a)1;i 〉 =∑
j,k〈ω(b)k,j , ω(a)1;i 〉 = uA(ω(a)1;i ) = 1 and analogously u(a)1 (ω(b)1;i ) = 1. By Proposition 5.29 from [62], we have ΩA ∩ F =
{ω ∈ ΩA | uF (ω) = 1}. Therefore a generating frame of F (a)1 is contained in F (b)1 and vice versa. Thus we find
F
(a)
1 = F
(b)
1 and u
(a)
1 = u
(b)
1 .
For the remaining indices, we construct an inductive proof: Choose L ∈ R large enough such that
a1 + L > max{ana , bnb}, and define x′ := x + L · u(a)1 , i.e. x′ =
∑na
j=1(aj + δj,1 · L)u(a)j =
∑nb
j=1(bj + δj,1 · L)u(b)j .
Furthermore defining a′1 := a2, a′2 := a3,..., a′na := a1 + L, u
(a′)
1 := u
(a)
2 , u
(a′)
2 := u
(a)
3 ,...,u
(a′)
na := u
(a)
1 and likewise for
b′j , we find x
′ =
∑na
j=1 a
′
ju
(a′)
j =
∑nb
j=1 b
′
ju
(b′)
j with a
′
1 < a
′
2 < ... < a
′
na and b
′
1 < b
′
2 < ... < b
′
nb
. Repeating the exact
same procedure as before, we obtain a′1 = b′1 and u
(a′)
1 = u
(b′)
1 , i.e. a2 = b2 and u
(a)
2 = u
(b)
2 . We iterate to find aj = bj
and u(a)j = u
(b)
j for all j. Note that as all maximal frames have the same size and as the projective units add up to uA,
necessarily na = nb.
At last we construct the projective measurement that corresponds to measuring the observable x:
For Fk, let Pk be the orthogonal projector onto the span of Fk (in particular, Pk : A → span(Fk) surjective). We
know that these projectors are positive and linear and satisfy uA ◦ Pk = uk. Furthermore 0 ≤ uk = uA ◦ Pk ≤ uA
and
∑
k uA ◦ Pk =
∑
k uk = uA, i.e. we obtain a well-defined measurement; therefore the Pk form a well-defined
instrument. As they are projectors, the Pk leave the elements of Fk unchanged.
VII.1.2. Proof of Observation 5
In order to show that H(ω) = S(ω) is consistent with Assumptions 1, we only have to show that ω 7→ S(ω) is
continuous, to comply with assumption (d). According to Theorem 10 (which we will prove below), the spectral
entropy S(ω) equals measurement entropy Ŝ(ω). But it is well-known [67] and easy to see from its definition that Ŝ
is continuous.
It remains to show eq. (9). So let ω =
∑
j pjωj be any decomposition of ω into perfectly distinguishable, not
necessarily pure states ωi. Decompose all the ωi into perfectly distinguishable pure states ω
(i)
j , i.e. ωj =
∑
i q
(i)
j ω
(i)
j .
Perfectly distinguishable states live in orthogonal faces, thus 〈ωi, ωj〉 = 0 for i 6= j (note that this is a conclusion
that follows from Postulates 1 and 2, but could not be drawn from bit symmetry alone in [64]). Thus, we also have
〈ω(j)i , ω(l)k 〉 = 0 for i 6= k or j 6= l, and so ω =
∑
ij pjq
(i)
j ω
(i)
j is a decomposition of ω into perfectly distinguishable
pure states. Define the real function η : [0, 1]→ R via η(x) := −x log x for x > 0 and η(0) = 0. Due to Theorem 3 and
η(xy) = −xy log x− xy log y, we have
η(ω) =
∑
ij
η(pjq
(i)
j )ω
(i)
j = −
∑
ij
pjq
(i)
j log pjω
(i)
j −
∑
ij
pjq
(i)
j
(
log q
(i)
j
)
ω
(i)
j ,
and therefore
S(ω) = uA(η(ω)) = −
∑
ij
pjq
(i)
j log pj −
∑
ij
pjq
(i)
j log q
(i)
j = −
∑
j
pj log pj +
∑
j
pj
(
−
∑
i
q
(i)
j log q
(i)
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(ωj)
This completes the proof of Observation 5.
VII.1.3. Proof of the second half of Theorem 11
Use the notation of the first half of the proof. We claim that maxϕ∈Ω〈ω, ϕ〉 = p1. The inequality “≥” is trivial
(consider the special case ϕ = ω1). To see the inequality “≤”, note that 〈ω, ϕ〉 =
∑
j pjλj , where λj := 〈ωj , ϕ〉 ∈ [0, 1]
satisfies
∑
j λj = 〈
∑
j ωj , ϕ〉 = 〈u, ϕ〉 = 1, and so 〈ω, ϕ〉 ≤ p1 for all ϕ. Thus
S∞(ω) = − log p1 = − log max
ϕ∈Ω
〈ω, ϕ〉 ≤ − log〈ω, ϕ1〉 = − log
q1 +∑
j≥2
qj〈ϕj , ϕ1〉
 ≤ − log q1 = H∞(q).
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Similarly as in the first part of the proof, we obtain Sˇ∞(ω) ≥ S∞(ω). The converse inequality from Theorem 10 for
α =∞ concludes the proof.
VII.1.4. Proof of Klein’s Inequality and the Second Law for projective measurements
We consider an ensemble of systems described by an arbitrary state ω ∈ ΩA. To all systems of this ensemble we
apply a projective measurement described by orthogonal projectors Pa which form an instrument, resulting in a new
ensemble state ω′. The Pa project onto the linear span of faces Fa that replace the eigenspaces from quantum theory.
We want to show that the measurement cannot decrease the entropy of the ensemble, i.e.
S(ω′) ≥ S(ω).
We decompose the proof into several steps. Our basic idea follows the proof of a similar statement for quantum
theory in [50]: We reduce the proof of the Second Law to Klein’s inequality. But as we do not have access to an
underlying pure state Hilbert space, we will need to use a different argument for why Klein’s inequality implies the
Second Law for projective measurements.
So at first we prove Klein’s inequality, adapting the proof of [50]. We note that a similar proof has also been found
by Scandolo [48], albeit under different assumptions.
Proof of Theorem 9. We consider two arbitrary states ω, ν with classical decompositions ω =
∑
j pjωj , ν =
∑
k qkνk,
where wlog the ωj and the νk form maximal frames. We define the matrix Pjk := 〈ωj , νk〉. All its components are
non-negative, i.e. Pjk ≥ 0, because the scalar product itself is non-negative for all states. As all maximal frames
have the same size, the matrix is a square matrix; as maximal frames sum to uA, the rows and columns sum to one:∑
j Pjk =
∑
k Pjk = 1. Thus, we get
S(ω‖ν) = −S(ω)− 〈ω, log ν〉 =
∑
j
pj log pj −
∑
jk
pj log qk 〈ωj , νk〉 =
∑
j
pj
(
log pj −
∑
k
Pjk log qk
)
.
We define rj :=
∑
k Pjkqk. Note that the rj form a probability distribution: rj ≥ 0 and
∑
j rj =
∑
k
∑
j Pjkqk =∑
k qk = 1. Using the strict concavity of the logarithm, we find:
log rj = log
(∑
k
Pjkqk
)
≥
∑
k
Pjk log qk.
Therefore we get
S(ω‖ν) =
∑
j
pj
(
log pj −
∑
k
Pjk log qk
)
≥
∑
j
pj (log pj − log rj) =
∑
j
pj log
(
pj
rj
)
.
We recognize the last expression as the classical relative entropy of the probability distributions pj and rj . This
classical relative entropy has the important property that it is never negative. Thus:
S(ω‖ν) ≥ 0.
In order to get the main proof less convoluted, we will state some technical parts as lemmas.
Lemma 14. Assume Postulate 1 and 2. Consider orthogonal projectors Pj which form an instrument. Then the Pj are mutually
orthogonal:
PkPj = δjkPj .
Proof. We prove PkPjω = 0 for all ω ∈ A, j 6= k. If Pjω = 0 this is trivial, so from now on assume Pjω 6= 0. As the
cone is generating (i.e. Span(A+) = A) and the projectors linear, it is sufficient to show PkPjω = 0 for all w ∈ A+.
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As Pj is positive, Pjω 6= 0 implies that (uA ◦ Pj)(ω) > 0 because only the zero-state is normalized to 0.
Using uA = uA ◦ (
∑
j Pj) =
∑
j uA ◦ Pj and PjPj = Pj :
1 = uA
(
Pjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
=
(
uA ◦
∑
k
Pk
)(
Pjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
= uA
(
PjPjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
+ uA
(∑
k|k 6=j PkPjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
= uA
(
Pjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
+ uA
(∑
k|k 6=j PkPjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
⇒ 0 = uA
(∑
k|k 6=j PkPjω
(uA ◦ Pj)(ω)
)
=
∑
k|k 6=j
uA (PkPjω) .
As the projectors are positive and only the zero-state is normalized to 0, this shows PkPjω = 0 for k 6= j.
Lemma 15. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Consider an orthogonal projector P which projects onto the linear span of a face F of
A+. Then for all states ω ∈ A+ we find Pω ∈ F .
Proof. From basic convex geometry (see e.g. Proposition 2.10 in [63]), we know that F = span(F ) ∩ A+. Since P is
positive, we have Pω ∈ A+; furthermore, since P projects onto F , we have Pω ∈ span(F ), thus Pω ∈ F .
Proof of Theorem 6. We know that S(ω‖ω′) = −S(ω) − 〈ω, logω′〉 ≥ 0. As in Theorem 11.9 from [50] , we claim
−〈ω, logω′〉 = S(ω′) and therefore −S(ω) + S(ω′) ≥ 0. Thus we only have to prove −〈ω, logω′〉 = S(ω′). But as we
do not have access to an underlying pure state Hilbert space, our proof is different from [50].
By Lemma 14, the Pa are mutually orthogonal, i.e. PaPb = δabPb. By symmetry of the Pa also the Paω are mutually
orthogonal: 〈Paω, Pbω〉 = 〈ω, PaPbω〉 = 0 for a 6= b. This also shows that the Fa are mutually orthogonal. If Paω = 0
we use the decomposition Paω = uA(Paω)
∑
k rakwak with rak = δak and wak an arbitrary generating frame of Fa.
If Paω 6= 0, then PaωuA(Paω) ∈ Fa ∩ ΩA and by Lemma 13, there is a classical decomposition PaωuA(Paω) =
∑
k rakωak with
ωak ∈ Fa. We complete the ωak to generating frames of the Fa by adding terms with rak = 0. As we are using
classical decompositions/frames, we know 〈ωaj , ωak〉 = δjk. Furthermore, as the Fa are mutually orthogonal, we
know 〈ωaj , ωbk〉 = 0 for a 6= b.
We note that the the waj form a maximal frame:
uA =
∑
a
uA ◦ Pa =
∑
a
uFa =
∑
a
∑
j
ωaj .
For a 6= b we have Pbωaj = PbPaωaj = 0, so we have a classical decomposition
ω′ =
∑
a
Paω =
∑
a
∑
j
uA(Paω)rajωaj
with ωaj a maximal frame that satisfies Paωbj = δabωbj . Note that we do not need to normalize ω′ as the measurement
itself is required to be normalized. Using∑
a
Pa logω
′ =
∑
bj
log(uA(Pbω)rbj)
∑
a
Paωbj =
∑
bj
log(uA(Pbω)rbj)ωbj = logω
′
and
− S(ω′) = −
∑
bj
(uA(Pbω)rbj) log(uA(Pbω)rbj) = 〈ω′, logω′〉 (12)
as well as the symmetry of the Pa we finally find:
− S(ω′) = 〈ω′, logω′〉 = 〈
∑
a
Paω, logω
′〉 = 〈ω,
∑
a
Pa logω
′〉 = 〈ω, logω′〉 . (13)
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VII.1.5. Proof that measurement and spectral entropies are identical
In the main text we encountered different ways to define the entropy. One of them is to adapt classical entropy
definitions by using the coefficients of a classical decomposition. Another is to adapt classical entropy definitions
by using measurement probabilities and minimizing over all fine-grained measurements. Here we will show that in
the context of Postulates 1 and 2, these two concepts yield the same Re´nyi entropies.
To prove this, we will first analyze fine-grained measurements in further detail. The results will allow us to
reproduce the quantum proof found in [66] for our GPTs.
Lemma 16. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Consider an arbitrary fine-grained measurement (e1, ..., en). Then for all j there exist
some cj ∈ [0, 1] and a pure state ωj ∈ ΩA such that ej = cj 〈ωj , ·〉.
Proof. If ej = 0, we can just take cj = 0 and any pure state ωj . So from now on assume ej 6= 0.
Because of self-duality there exists some ω′ ∈ A+ such that 〈ω′, ·〉 = ej . As ej 6= 0 also ω′ 6= 0 and therefore
uA(ω
′) 6= 0. With A+ = R≥0 · ΩA and cj := uA(ω′) > 0 there exists an ω ∈ ΩA such that ω′ = cj · ω. We
want to prove that ω is pure, so assume it was not pure. Then it has a classical decomposition ω =
∑N
k=0 pkωk
with pk > 0 and N ≥ 1. By relabelling we can assume j = n, i.e. we consider en = cj
∑N
k=0 pk 〈ωk, ·〉. Define
a measurement (e′1, ..., e′n+N ) by e
′
k := ek for all k = 1, 2, ..., n − 1 and e′n+i := cjpi 〈ωi, ·〉 for all i = 0, 1, ..., N .
Because of 0 ≤ cjpi 〈ωi, ·〉 = e′n+i and
∑n+N
k=1 e
′
k =
∑n−1
k=1 ek +
∑N
i=0 cjpi 〈ωi, ·〉 =
∑n
k=1 ek = uA this is a well-defined
measurement.
Now define M : {1, ..., n+N} → {1, ..., n} by M(i) := i for all i = 1, ..., n− 1 and M(i) := n for all i = n, ..., n+N .
Then we get ∑
{a|M(a)=i}
e′a = ei for i < n
∑
{a|M(a)=i}
e′a =
n+N∑
a=n
e′i = en for i = n.
Thus the measurement (e′1, ..., e′n+N ) is a refinement of (e1, ..., en). With e
′
n(ω0) = cjp0 = en(ω0) and e′n(ω1) = 0 6=
en(ω1) we find that e′n is not proportional to en, thus the fine-graining is non-trivial. This is in contradiction to our
assumptions. Thus ω has to be pure. Furthermore 1 = uA(ω) ≥ ej(ω) = cj 〈ω, ω〉 = cj .
So in total we have found that ej = cj 〈ω, ·〉with ω ∈ ΩA pure and cj ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 17. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Let ω ∈ ΩA and ω =
∑d
j=1 pjωj be a decomposition into a maximal frame. Then the
measurement that perfectly distinguishes the ωj (i.e. ek(ωj) = δjk) can be chosen to be fine-grained.
Proof. Define ej := 〈ωj , ·〉. As maximal frames add up to the order unit, this is a well-defined measurement and it
satisfies ej(ωk) = δjk. It remains to show that this measurement is fine-grained.
Consider a fine-graining e′k with ei =
∑
{j|M(j)=i} e
′
j . By self-duality, there exist cj ≥ 0 and ω′j ∈ ΩA such that
e′j = cj 〈ω′j , ·〉 and therefore
∑
{j|M(j)=k} cjω
′
j = ωk. As 1 = uA(ωk) =
∑
{j|M(j)=k} cjuA(ω
′
j) =
∑
{j|M(j)=k} cj we
find that
∑
{j|M(j)=k} cjω
′
j = ωk is a convex decomposition of a pure state. This requires cj = 0 or ω
′
j = ωk. In both
cases e′j = cj 〈ωk, ·〉 = cjek holds true for all j with M(j) = k. Therefore, the fine-graining is trivial.
Lemma 18. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Consider a fine-grained measurement e = (e1, ..., eN ) ∈ E∗. Then the maximal
number of perfectly distinguishable states d (often denoted as NA) satisfies d ≤ N .
Furthermore, consider a state ω ∈ ΩA with classical decomposition ω =
∑d
j=1 pjωj into a maximal frame. Define the vector
q := (ej(ω))1≤j≤N of outcome probabilities and the N -component vector p = (p1, ..., pd, 0, ..., 0) ∈ RN . Then q ≺ p, i.e.
there exists a bistochastic N ×N -matrix M with q = Mp.
Proof. By Lemma 16 there exist cj ∈ [0, 1] and pure ω′j ∈ ΩA such that ej = cj 〈ω′j , ·〉. Define ql := el(ω) = cl 〈ω′l, ω〉.
Using
∑N
j=1 ej = uA and
∑d
j=1 νj = uA for an arbitrary maximal frame (ν1, ..., νd) we find:
N∑
j=1
cj =
N∑
j=1
cjuA(ω
′
j) = uA
 N∑
j=1
cjω
′
j
 = uA(uA) = uA
 d∑
j=1
νj
 = d∑
j=1
uA(νj) =
d∑
j=1
1 = d.
As cj ∈ [0, 1],
∑N
j=1 cj = d shows d ≤ N .
25
Set ql|j := el(ωj), introduce the N -component vector p := (p1, ..., pd, 0, ..., 0) and use that measurement effects and
states of maximal frames add up to the order unit:
d∑
j=1
ql|jpj =
d∑
j=1
el(pjωj) = el(ω) = ql,
d∑
j=1
ql|j =
d∑
j=1
el(ωj) = cl
d∑
j=1
〈ω′l, ωj〉 = cluA(ω′l) = cl,
N∑
l=1
ql|j =
N∑
l=1
el(ωj) = uA(ωj) = 1.
For j ≤ d we define Ml,j := ql|j . If d < N we also define Ml,j := 1−clN−d for N ≥ j > d. M is an N ×N -matrix and it is
bistochastic: first of all, Ml,j ≥ 0 for all l, j. Furthermore:
N∑
l=1
Ml,j =
N∑
l=1
ql|j = 1 for j ≤ d,
N∑
l=1
Ml,j =
N∑
l=1
1− cl
N − d =
N − d
N − d = 1 for j > d,
N∑
j=1
Ml,j =
d∑
j=1
ql|j + (N − d) · 1− cl
N − d = cl + 1− cl = 1.
This bistochastic matrix maps p to q, i.e. M · p = q:
N∑
j=1
Ml,jpj =
d∑
j=1
ql|jpj = ql.
Now we come to the proof of the theorem:
Proof of Theorem 10. Consider an arbitrary fine-grained measurement (e1, ..., eN ) and an arbitrary state ω ∈ ΩA with
classical decomposition ω =
∑d
j=1 pjωj into a maximal frame. Define ql := el(ω) and the N -component vector
p = (p1, ..., pd, 0, ..., 0). Let M be the bistochastic matrix from Lemma 18 with q = M · p. By Birkhoff’s theorem,
it is a convex combination of permutation matrices, i.e. M =
∑
σ∈SN aσPσ for a probability distribution aσ and
permutation matrices Pσ . Wlog we only consider the Shannon entropy; the proof for the Re´nyi entropies works
exactly the same way. As the Shannon entropy is Schur-concave and invariant under permutations:
H(q) ≥
∑
σ∈SN
aσH(Pσ · p) =
∑
σ∈SN
aσH(p) = H(p) = S(ω).
Furthermore H(p) = −∑dj=1 pj log pj = S(ω) is the entropy of a measurement that perfectly distinguishes the ωj ,
i.e. ej(ωk) = δjk. Because of Lemma 17, such a measurement can be chosen to be finegrained. Therefore we find:
Ĥ(ω) = inf
e∈E∗
H(e(ω)) = H(p) = S(ω).
VII.1.6. Proof of Theorem 12
As mentioned in the main text, the equivalences (i) ⇔ (iii) ⇔ (iv) ⇔ (v) are shown in [43]. We will now prove
the equivalence (ii)⇔ (v), which proves Theorem 12. Taking into account Theorem 10, and formulating the atomic
covering property in the context of theories that satisfy Postulates 1 and 2, it remains to show the equivalence of the
following two statements:
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(ii’) For all states ω ∈ ΩA, we have Sˇ0(ω) ≥ S0(ω).
(v’) If F is any face of A+, and ω is any pure state, then the smallest face G that contains both F and ω has rank
|G| ≤ |F |+ 1. (Note that this is trivial if ω ⊥ F .)
We will first prove that (ii′) ⇒ (v′), which is equivalent to ¬(v′) ⇒ ¬(ii′). So suppose that there exists some face
F of A+ and a pure state ω such that the face G generated by both has rank |G| ≥ |F |+ 2. Let ω1, . . . , ω|F | be a frame
that generates the face F . Then F is also generated by ν := 1|F |
∑|F |
j=1 ωj , i.e. the normalized projective unit of F .
This is because every face containing ν also contains all the ωj (and vice versa), and F is the smallest face with this
property.
Now consider the state 12ω+
1
2ν. The smallest face that contains this state must beG. If this state had a decomposi-
tion into |F |+1 or fewer perfectly distinguishable pure states, then these would also generateG, and so |G| ≤ |F |+1,
in contradiction to our assumption. Thus any decomposition of 12ω +
1
2ν into perfectly distinguishable pure states
uses at least |F |+2 states with non-zero coefficients, i.e. S0( 12ω+ 12ν) ≥ log(|F |+2). But 12ω+ 12ν = 12|F |
∑|F |
j=1 ωj+
1
2ω
is a convex decomposition into |F |+ 1 pure states, thus
Sˇ0
(
1
2
ω +
1
2
ν
)
≤ log(|F |+ 1) < log(|F |+ 2) ≤ S0
(
1
2
ω +
1
2
ν
)
.
It remains to show that (v′) ⇒ (ii′). So suppose that (v’) holds, but that there is a state ω ∈ ΩA with Sˇ0(ω) < S0(ω);
we will show that this leads to a contradiction. By definition of Sˇ0, if this is the case, then there exist pure states
ω1, . . . , ωn with n = exp(Sˇ0(ω)) and p1, . . . , pn ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1, such that ω =
∑n
i=1 piωi. Using property (v’), and
recursively looking at the faces generated by ω1, generated by ω1, ω2, generated by ω1, ω2, ω3 and so forth, shows that
the rank of the face G generated by ω1, . . . , ωn can be at most n. Since ω ∈ G, this shows that ω can be decomposed
into n or fewer pure perfectly distinguishable states. Therefore S0(ω) ≤ log n = Sˇ0(ω).
VII.2. Some additional remarks on Theorem 12 and quantum logic
The GPT framework has a close relation to quantum logic. This is not surprising, since much of the terminology of
generalized probabilistic theories has appeared much earlier, in work on quantum logic and beyond. The approach
via convex sets of states and observables can be traced back to Mackey [18] (who immediately made connections to
quantum logic), and was developed further through the 1960s and beyond. A partial list of references includes [14,
20, 88], the last two of which offer axiomatic characterizations of quantum theory. Interaction with the quantum logic
tradition continued, with the orthomodularity of the lattice of faces of the state and/or effect spaces often providing
a point of contact, especially in Ludwig’s work [20]. Also closely related to the convex sets approach was the work
of Foulis and Randall [10–13] who, for example, studied ways of combining probabilistic systems.
Since Postulates 1 and 2 imply that the state cone A+ is self-dual (so coincides with the effect cone), and that
each face of this cone is the intersection of the cone with the image of a filter (equivalently given self-duality, a
compresssion in the sense of [24]), we have from these postulates alone, via e.g. [24], Theorem 8.10, that the face lattice
is orthomodular. The notion of orthomodular partially ordered set, or its special case, the notion of orthomodular
lattice, is often taken to define the notion of quantum logic, so we can say that Postulates 1 and 2 imply that the face
lattice of the cone of states, (equivalently of the cone of effects, or of the set of normalized states) is a quantum logic.
The covering property, in its most common variant the atomic covering property, states that for any element x of the
lattice and any atom a not below or equal to x, a ∨ x covers x.9 The equivalence of (iv) and (v), in a setting more
general than Postulates 1 and 2, is Proposition 9.7 of [24] (first appearing in Proposition 4.2 in [25] and the discussion
preceding it). Along with orthomodularity, the covering law was one of the assumptions of Piron’s famous lattice-
theoretic characterization ([94]; also [17] and see the discussion in [27] or for more detail and proofs, [26] pp. 18-38,
114-122) of a class of lattices close to, although larger than, that of real, complex, and quaternionic quantum theory.
A generalization of the covering law was also used in Ludwig’s axiomatization (see e.g. [20]10) of quantum theory
within the convex sets framework, in which the relevant lattice is a lattice of faces of the state space (equivalent to
a lattice of extremal effects in his context), and the result characterized real, complex, and quaternionic quantum
theory.11
9 Here “y covers x” means “y ≥ x, y 6= x, and there is no z distinct
from x and y such that y ≥ z ≥ x, i.e. “y is above x with nothing in
between. An atom is an element that covers 0.
10 The results in [20] were mostly obtained in a series of papers in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
11 Both Piron and Ludwig also made an atomicity assumption (which
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may be considered more technical than substantive, and always
holds in finite dimension) and also assumed lattice dimension 4 or
greater, so Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or less were not dealt with,
nor were spin factors or the exceptional Jordan algebra. These low-
dimensional cases also satisfy Piron’s, and Ludwig’s premises, but
a theorem ruling out other instances satisfying them appears to be
lacking.
